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War Powers Litigation After
Zivotofsky v. Clinton
Michael D. Ramsey*
INTRODUCTION
In modern times, judicial opinions have been largely absent
from the debate over constitutional war powers. Among other
things, it is widely assumed—especially in light of the courts’
avoidance of the issue during the Vietnam War—that the
political question doctrine would preclude judicial determination
of war-initiation powers. In Zivotofsky v. Clinton,1 however, the
Supreme Court appeared to re-characterize and limit the political
question doctrine in a way that might allow wider litigation of
war powers issues. According to Zivotofsky, the doctrine does not
preclude courts from determining the meaning of statutes and
the Constitution in separation of powers disputes, even when
substantial foreign affairs issues are at stake.2
The actual subject of the Zivotofsky litigation was, however,
relatively modest as foreign affairs controversies go. The courts’
willingness to retreat from the political question doctrine will be
more severely tested in matters of greater foreign affairs
significance, such as war powers. This essay considers the
implications of Zivotofsky for war powers litigation, including by
revisiting the Vietnam-era decisions. It first asks whether
Zivotofsky, if taken at face value, does indeed suggest a renewed
viability of war powers litigation. Second, it asks whether, as a
practical matter, courts can comfortably undertake the task of
war powers adjudication. Third, it considers the value of more
aggressive war powers adjudication, including whether a
Zivotofsky-inspired approach to war powers disputes is consistent
with the courts’ constitutional role.
* Hugh and Hazel Darling Foundation Professor of Law and Faculty Director of
International and Comparative Law Programs, University of San Diego Law School.
Thanks to Curtis Bradley, Tom Campbell, Michael Glennon, Martin Lederman,
Saikrishna Prakash, Lisa Ramsey, Michael Rappaport, Stephen Vladeck, Ingrid
Wuerth, and participants in the Yale-Duke Foreign Relations Law Roundtable for
helpful comments.
1 566 U.S. 189 (2012).
2 Id. at 194–96.
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I. ZIVOTOFSKY AS DOCTRINAL CHANGE
Zivotofsky v. Clinton appears to signal a major shift in
thinking about justiciability in separation of powers disputes.3
Briefly, the case concerned a statute allowing U.S. citizens born
in Jerusalem to request passports reflecting birth in “Jerusalem,
Israel.”4 The U.S. executive branch refused to apply the statute,
invoking the president’s supposedly exclusive control of foreign
affairs and the diplomatically sensitive nature of Jerusalem’s
political status. In a suit to enforce the statute, brought by the
parents of Zivotofsky, a U.S. citizen born in Jerusalem, the D.C.
Circuit found the case to be a non-justiciable political question.5
Chief Justice Roberts’ opinion for six Justices reversed,
emphasizing the central role of the judiciary in determining the
meaning of the Constitution.6 Roberts’ opinion acknowledged
that a political question might exist (a) if the Constitution’s text
committed the decision to another branch or (b) if there were no
judicially manageable standards by which to decide. But it found
neither circumstance to exist in the passport dispute; to the
contrary, the opinion emphasized that the case involved
determining the constitutionality of a statute, which is “what
courts do.”7
Prior to Zivotofsky, political question analysis had been
dominated by Justice Brennan’s six-factor test in Baker v. Carr.8
Baker had been cited repeatedly by lower courts in political
question cases9 (including the lower courts in Zivotofsky), and by
then-Justice Rehnquist’s influential concurring opinion in
Goldwater v. Carter, an opinion that seemed strongly to disfavor
justiciability in separation of powers cases.10 But Zivotofsky

3 See Ganesh Sitaraman & Ingrid Wuerth, The Normalization of Foreign Relations
Law, 128 HARV. L. REV. 1897, 1925–26 (2015) (describing Zivotofsky as having “farreaching significance” for justiciability of foreign relations law cases).
4 Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 2003, Pub. L. No. 107–228,
§ 213(d), 116 Stat. 1350, 1366, § 214(d) (2002).
5 See Zivotofsky v. Sec’y of State, 571 F.3d 1227, 1232–33 (D.C. Cir. 2009)
(principally concluding that decisions regarding recognition are textually committed to
the executive branch); see also id. at 1240, 1244–45 (Judge Edwards, concurring) (finding
on the merits that Section 214(d) unconstitutionally interfered with the president’s
executive power).
6 Zivotofsky, 566 U.S. at 191. Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, Ginsburg, and
Kagan joined Chief Justice Roberts’ opinion. Justice Sotomayor concurred in part and in
the result, and Justice Alito concurred in the result. Justice Breyer was the sole dissenter.
7 Id. at 201.
8 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962).
9 See, e.g., Alperin v. Vatican Bank, 410 F.3d 532, 544, 549–58 (9th Cir. 2005)
(sequentially applying each of Baker’s six factors).
10 Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 1002–06 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., joined by
Burger, C.J., Stewart, J., & Stevens, J., concurring).
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barely mentioned Baker, citing it only in passing.11 More
importantly, Zivotofsky—although rejecting a political question
challenge—mentioned only two of Baker’s six factors (the ones
noted above); it did not at any point describe the political
question doctrine as resting on a six-factor test or acknowledge
that Baker had suggested a six-factor test.12 And even more
notably, the Baker factors Zivotofsky failed to mention were the
most open-ended, the most easily invoked to defeat justiciability,
and the most apparently relevant to Zivotofsky itself
in particular: “the impossibility of a court’s undertaking
independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect
due coordinate branches of government”; “an unusual need
for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already
made”; or “the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious
pronouncements by various departments on one question.”13
Also of note, the Zivotofsky majority opinion did not discuss
Rehnquist’s concurring opinion in Goldwater—and Rehnquist’s
analysis in Goldwater seems inconsistent with it. Goldwater
involved the question whether the president had to obtain the
Senate’s approval before terminating a treaty in accordance with
the treaty’s terms.14 Although it involved the constitutionality of
an executive action rather than the constitutionality of a statute,
in other respects the dispute in Goldwater fit with Roberts’
description of a question of constitutional law directed to the
courts. As in Zivotofsky, Goldwater did not question the merits of
the president’s policy; the question was not what decision
should be made, but which branch, constitutionally, should make
the decision.
In sum, Zivotofsky appears to reaffirm and extend the
view that foreign affairs controversies involving only the
interpretation of statutes or the Constitution are not
qualitatively different from ordinary statutory and constitutional
questions. In disregarding Goldwater and much of Baker, it
appears substantially to narrow the grounds upon which a

11 See Zivotofsky, 566 U.S. at 195, 197, 201 (citing Baker directly only once, and
indirectly only as quoted—incompletely—in Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224,
228 (1993)).
12 Compare Zivotofsky, 566 U.S. at 195, 197, with id. at 202 (Sotomayor J.,
concurring in the judgment) (“In Baker, this Court identified six circumstances in which
an issue might present a political question . . . .”).
13 See Baker, 369 U.S. at 217.
14 See Goldwater, 444 U.S. at 996. There was no opinion of the Court in Goldwater,
so Zivotofsky was under no obligation to cite it—but the Zivotofsky majority’s decision not
to discuss Justice Rehnquist’s concurrence, which attracted four votes and had been seen
as an important statement of the political question doctrine, seems significant.
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political question can be found, and thus to open more separation
of powers controversies to judicial resolution.
The question remains, however, whether Zivotofsky is an
isolated decision or a meaningful shift. Zivotofsky involved a
relatively minor—even obscure—dispute about the wording of
the passports of (one assumes) a very small number of people.
Little evidence existed of major foreign policy disruption.15
Zivotofsky’s viability when the Court confronts more momentous
matters seems open to doubt.
To think about that question, consider the justiciability of
war powers disputes. Under the Baker formulation—especially as
applied in Goldwater—conventional wisdom has been that
questions of the president’s unilateral ability to use military force
are likely non-justiciable. But Zivotofsky calls that assumption
into doubt, first by suggesting that constitutional disputes in
foreign affairs are matters granted to the judiciary for resolution,
and second by apparently dispensing with Baker’s concern for
“respect due coordinate branches” and “embarrassment” arising
from “multifarious pronouncements” on foreign affairs.16
Zivotofsky’s viability, however, may itself depend on the ability to
construct a framework of justiciability for war powers disputes
that is manageable and plausible.
II. POLITICAL QUESTIONS AND VIETNAM-ERA WAR POWERS
LITIGATION
To make more concrete the questions posed above, this
section considers the most extensive modern litigation of
constitutional war powers. During the Vietnam War era, from
1967 through 1974, lower courts heard multiple challenges to the
war’s constitutionality. None of these challenges was successful
in limiting the war, and none reached the Supreme Court apart
from a single unexplained affirmance of a three-judge district
court.17 Nonetheless, these cases provide a concrete historical
example of war powers litigation.
To begin, there is something of a myth that the Vietnam-era
cases declared all war powers questions to be political questions.
Some cases did, but others found some war powers issues to be
political questions and others not to be. The diversity of
questions and answers in the Vietnam-era thus offers a way to
Zivotofsky, 566 U.S. at 191–94.
Baker, 369 U.S. at 216–17, 225. These were the principal Baker factors not
discussed in Zivotofsky.
17 Atlee v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 911 (1973).
15
16
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start thinking about what a post-Zivotofsky war powers
justiciability analysis might involve.
Courts in the Vietnam era pursued at least three different
approaches. Two major cases found war powers litigation broadly
to be political questions. The D.C. Circuit, in one of the early
cases, reached this conclusion almost without analysis, resting
principally on the proposition that foreign affairs matters were
for the president to determine.18 Somewhat later, a three-judge
district court in Pennsylvania reached a similar conclusion after
much more extended analysis; the Supreme Court affirmed this
decision without opinion.19
The Second Circuit pursued an intermediate course in a
series of cases. It found the basic question whether congressional
authorization was needed for war initiation to be justiciable; on
the merits, it found that congressional authorization was
constitutionally required and had been given.20 However,
ostensibly on political question grounds, it held that the method
of authorization was up to Congress (thus rejecting, for example,
the proposition that an actual formal declaration was required
and accepting congressional authorization via the Gulf of Tonkin
Resolution and appropriations in support of the military effort).21
In further litigation, the Second Circuit invoked the political
question doctrine to avoid deciding two specific challenges. First,
plaintiffs contended that the president’s decision to bomb North
Vietnam and mine North Vietnamese harbors after a ceasefire
lacked congressional approval.22 At this point, Congress had
repealed the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution and indicated that the
war should be wound down. Plaintiffs argued that the president’s
actions were unapproved escalations, while the president argued
that renewed bombing to enforce the ceasefire was the best way
to achieve Congress’s goals.23 The court, on political question
grounds, refused to second-guess the President’s strategic
18 Luftig v. McNamara, 373 F.2d 664, 665–66 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (“The fundamental
division of authority and power established by the Constitution precludes judges from
overseeing the conduct of foreign policy or the use and disposition of military power; these
matters are plainly the exclusive province of Congress and the Executive.”).
19 Atlee v. Laird, 347 F. Supp. 689, 698–707 (E.D. Pa. 1972) (relying heavily on
Baker v. Carr), aff’d without opinion sub nom., Atlee v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 911 (1973);
see also Commonwealth of Mass. v. Laird, 451 F.2d 26, 32–33 (1st Cir. 1971) (finding the
whole matter of war powers to be a political question, at least in the absence of an
objection by Congress to the president’s actions).
20 Orlando v. Laird, 443 F.2d 1039, 1042–43 (2d Cir. 1971).
21 Id. at 1043; accord DaCosta v. Laird, 448 F.2d 1368, 1370 (2d Cir. 1971); Berk v.
Laird, 429 F.2d 302, 305 (2d Cir. 1970).
22 Orlando, 443 F.2d at 1041.
23 Id.
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assessment.24 In a subsequent case, plaintiffs argued that
the President’s bombing of Cambodia—ostensibly a neutral
country—was not authorized by Congress. The President
similarly claimed that the bombing was the best way to wind
down U.S. involvement, and the court (this time over a dissent by
Judge Oakes) refused to decide on political question grounds.25
A third group of opinions showed greater willingness to
reach the merits. In a subsequent case in the D.C. Circuit, a
divided panel followed the Second Circuit in finding that
congressional authorization for the war was constitutionally
required, and then, rejecting the Second Circuit’s analysis,
concluded that Congress’s authorization could not be found
merely from appropriations and other statutes passed to support
the war effort.26 (Like most of the Second Circuit opinions, this
case came after Congress’s repeal of the Gulf of Tonkin
Resolution.) As a remedy, however, the court found injunctive
relief inappropriate because at that point, the president (at
Congress’s direction) appeared to be ending the U.S. involvement
in any event.27 In addition, two dissenting opinions from the
cases mentioned above argued for reaching the merits. Judge
Lord dissented at length from the three-judge panel’s political
question conclusion.28 In the Second Circuit, Judge Oakes would
have found the Cambodian bombing unauthorized (at least after
DaCosta v. Laird, 471 F.2d 1146, 1152–53 (2d Cir. 1973).
Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 484 F.2d 1307 (2d Cir. 1973). The district court ruled on
the merits that the Cambodia bombing was unconstitutional and directed that it cease. In
a once-famous flurry of motions, the court of appeals stayed the district court order, and
the plaintiffs asked Justice Thurgood Marshall, as circuit justice, to vacate the stay.
When Marshall refused, plaintiffs asked Justice Douglas to lift the stay, and he did. See
Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 414 U.S. 1304 (1973) (Justice Marshall); id. at 1320 (Justice
Douglas). On a motion from the government, Justice Marshall, with the concurrence of
the full Court apart from Justice Douglas, overturned Justice Douglas’s order. See
Schlesinger v. Holtzman, 414 U.S. 1321, 1322 (1973). Ultimately, as noted in the text, the
Second Circuit reversed the district court on political question grounds and the Supreme
Court denied certiorari. See Holtzman, 484 F.2d at 1315, cert. denied, 416 U.S. 936 (1974).
26 Mitchell v. Laird, 488 F.2d 611, 615–16 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (concluding that “none of
the legislation drawn to the court's attention [including appropriations and extension of
the military draft] may serve as a valid assent to the Vietnam war”). As noted in the
opinion, Judge Tamm would have found appropriations an adequate authorization. Id. at
615. Four judges, including Judge Tamm, favored rehearing the case en banc on the
grounds that appropriations were a proper mode of authorization. Id. at 616 (statement of
Judge MacKinnon, joined by Judges Tamm, Robb, and Wilkey).
27 Id. at 616 (finding it to be a political question whether the president was
proceeding appropriately to end the war).
28 Atlee v. Laird, 347 F. Supp. 689, 709, 712 (E.D. Pa. 1972) (Judge Lord, dissenting)
(“This case does not involve second guessing the wisdom of the Executive in a matter
committed by the Constitution to that branch of the Government. It is rather a
constitutional question concerning the division of power within our system, involving a
determination of whether the executive branch has exceeded the scope of its
constitutional power.”).
24
25
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repeal of the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution) because it had been secret
and because it constituted a fundamental change in the scope of
the war by involving an additional country in hostilities.29
These cases suggest at least three types of questions in war
powers litigation: (1) whether Congress’s authorization of military
action is required; (2) if so, whether Congress has authorized it;
and (3) the scope of Congress’s authorization. They further
suggest, as developed in the next section, that some of these
questions are more susceptible to judicial resolution than others.
III. WAR POWERS LITIGATION AFTER ZIVOTOFSKY
This section considers the extent to which Zivotofsky
vindicates the stronger view of war powers litigation in the
Vietnam era. I conclude that it does, with significant limitations.
A.

Standing
At the outset, it is worth noting that narrower modern views
of standing would change the dynamics of the Vietnam-era
litigation. Several of the major cases depended on theories of
standing that are likely no longer viable: citizen suits, suits
based on remote possibilities, and suits based on the standing of
members of Congress.30 However, the litigation also reflected at
least one theory of standing likely still available: suit by a
member of the military challenging deployment into combat.31 It
is also possible that people overseas affected by the conflict might
have standing if U.S. citizens are in the war zone32 or if the Court
recognizes the ability of non-citizens abroad to sue to enforce
constitutional provisions.33 Further, it remains an open question
whether Congress as a whole or one of its Houses (as opposed to
individual members) can bring suit to protect congressional
powers.34 Thus, modern standing law is likely to limit, but not
foreclose, the possibility of war powers litigation.
29 Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 484 F.2d 1307, 1315–18 (2d Cir. 1973) (Judge
Oakes, dissenting).
30 See, e.g., id. at 1307, 1315 (congressional standing); Mitchell, 488 F.2d at 613–14
(congressional standing); Atlee, 347 F. Supp. at 691 (taxpayer standing).
31 See, e.g., Berk v. Laird, 429 F.2d 302, 306–07 (2d Cir. 1970).
32 See Ramirez de Arellano v. Weinberger, 745 F.2d 1500, 1515–21 (D.C. Cir. 1984)
(finding U.S. citizen had standing to challenge U.S. military actions on his land in
Honduras), vacated and remanded on other grounds, Weinberger v. Ramirez de Arellano,
471 U.S. 1113 (1985).
33 A possibility suggested by Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 795–98 (2008).
34 See U.S. House of Representatives v. Burwell, 130 F. Supp. 3d 53, 66–77 (D.D.C.
2015) (generally finding the question of the standing of the House of Representatives to be
unresolved by prior cases, and concluding in the particular case that the House as an
institution had standing to challenge some actions of the president); see also Ariz. State
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B.

Questions Involving Congressional Approval
Whether Congress must authorize a military action has two
components: (1) whether the declare war clause gives Congress
exclusive authority over initiating war; and (2) if so, whether the
conflict at issue is a “war” that requires Congress’s authorization.
In Zivotofsky’s terms, the first question seems clearly one for the
courts. It is a question of the Constitution’s meaning in the
abstract; it does not require attention to any particular factors of
any particular conflict. It is not meaningfully different from the
question, for example, whether the president has authority to
seize steel mills to avert a strike, or whether the president has
authority to terminate treaties without Senate approval. True, it
might lead to a decision that a particular executive-initiated
conflict is unauthorized—quite possibly running afoul of the Baker
factors of embarrassment and multifarious pronouncements—but
Zivotofsky appears to discount those factors, at least where a pure
question of law is presented. True also, the constitutional
question may be a hard one (at least for some types of conflicts),
but Zivotofsky makes clear that even a difficult question of
constitutional meaning is for the courts to decide.35
As a result, a post-Zivotofsky analysis confirms the view of
the Second and D.C. Circuits in the Vietnam era that the need
for congressional authorization is (or at least can be) a judicial
question. The decisions that instead found a political question on
this point rested on the proposition that the scope of the
president’s foreign affairs powers is broadly nonjusticiable36—a
proposition rejected in Zivotofsky. Nor is it clear that judicial
engagement with the question is problematic: courts managed it
in the Vietnam era37 as well as in earlier times.38
The second part of the authorization question is more
problematic. Hostilities exist on a scale from minor skirmishes to
total war. Some line must be drawn unless one thinks
Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 135 S. Ct. 2652, 2663, 2665 n.12 (2015)
(finding that Arizona legislature had standing to contest allegedly unconstitutional
diminution of its powers, but expressly reserving the question of whether the U.S.
Congress would have standing to challenge actions of the president).
35 See Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 566 U.S. 189, 201 (2012) (acknowledging difficulty of the
case but finding it to “demand[] careful examination of the textual, structural, and
historical evidence put forward by the parties regarding the nature of the statute and of
the passport and recognition powers”).
36 See, e.g., Luftig v. McNamara, 373 F.2d 664, 665–66 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
37 See, e.g., DaCosta v. Laird, 448 F.2d 1368, 1369–70 (2d Cir. 1971).
38 See The Brig Amy Warwick (The Prize Cases), 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635, 665–67
(1863) (deciding on the merits whether President Lincoln’s naval blockade of the South
during the Civil War was constitutional); see also infra Part IV (discussing
additional cases).
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(implausibly) that either all military actions must be authorized
by Congress or none must be. The difficulty of drawing the line in
some circumstances should not preclude adjudication when the
line is clear, however, as the Second Circuit found in the
Vietnam-era cases.39 Further, the issue can be made more
manageable if courts approach it categorically, finding that the
presence of certain circumstances do or do not bring a conflict
within the need for approval. For example, in the 2011 Libya
conflict, the President argued that congressional approval was
not required because U.S. military actions consisted wholly of
airstrikes, were of limited duration, and did not involve major
threats to U.S. personnel.40 With these descriptions being largely
uncontested as a factual matter, a court could decide as a matter
of constitutional interpretation whether a conflict so described
requires congressional authorization.
On the other hand, some situations may resist categorical
assessment because they depend on disputed or uncertain facts
or subjective characterizations. For example, the U.S. military
action in Iraq and Syria against the Islamic State seems
challenging to describe categorically: the nature of the Islamic
State, the extent of the U.S. role, and the U.S. objectives seem
sufficiently unsettled that judicial assessment would be, at
minimum, a qualitatively different task than the one envisioned
in Zivotofsky.41
C.

Questions Involving the Type of Congressional Approval
A second major issue in the Vietnam era was whether
Congress could authorize hostilities either by appropriations or
by the vaguely worded Gulf of Tonkin Resolution. Courts divided
on whether that question was justiciable.42 Zivotofsky suggests
that it should be. A court’s analysis here would not seem to
depend on factual assessments or subjective characterizations.
For example, the D.C. Circuit held that appropriations do not
39 E.g., DaCosta, 448 F.2d at 1369 (concluding that the Vietnam conflict was a war
for constitutional purposes).
40 Authority to Use Military Force in Libya, 35 Op. O.L.C. 1, 6–14 (2011); see also
Michael D. Ramsey, Constitutional War Initiation and the Obama Presidency, 110 AMER.
J. INT’L L. 701, 701–07, 711–13 (2016) (discussing the constitutional debate over the Libya
action). Compare Harold Hongju Koh, The War Powers and Humanitarian Intervention,
53 HOUS. L. REV. 971, 980–98 (2016) (defending the constitutionality of the U.S. military
action), with Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, Military Force and Violence but Neither War
nor Hostilities, 64 DRAKE L. REV. 995, 998–1005 (2016) (finding the Libya action
unconstitutional).
41 See infra Part VI (discussing post-Zivotofsky litigation challenging U.S. military
action against the Islamic State).
42 See supra Part II.
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count as approval for constitutional purposes.43 Whether this is
correct or not is a question of constitutional interpretation
separate from the facts, policies, and descriptions of any
particular conflict; the analysis would be analogous to the way
the Court described Zivotofsky as requiring “careful examination
of the textual, structural, and historical evidence put forward by
the parties regarding the nature of the statute and of the
passport and recognition powers.”44
One might conclude—as the Second Circuit did—that the
Constitution delegates to Congress the decision how to authorize
military conflict. Perhaps that makes it a political question
(textually committed to another branch), as the Second Circuit
described it.45 But Zivotofsky indicates that it is better
understood as a decision on the merits: if the Constitution does
not require any particular method of authorization, plaintiffs’
challenge to Congress’s method of authorization fails on the
merits. Similarly, one might say in Zivotofsky that the
president’s recognition power is exclusive and gives the president
power to decide how to describe the status of Jerusalem. But as
the decision in Zivotofsky (and the subsequent litigation)46
indicates, that is a question on the merits—whether the
Constitution (as interpreted by the judiciary) gives the president
that exclusive authority.
In sum, courts should be able to decide, post-Zivotofsky,
whether the Constitution requires Congress’s authorization to be
given in particular ways.
D. Questions Involving the Scope of Congressional Approval
The most difficult of the Vietnam-era cases appear to be
challenges to the scope of congressional approval. These are
almost necessarily fact-intensive—both what Congress approved
and what is going on in a particular conflict. For example, if one
concluded that after repeal of the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution,
Congress had approved only actions designed to wind down the
war, it is (as the Second Circuit found) hard to say what
activities are designed to wind down the war.47 The decision of
43 Mitchell v. Laird, 488 F.2d 611, 615 (D.C. Cir. 1973). In doing so, the court
famously relied on “what every schoolboy knows”: that once hostilities begin, Congress
will feel an obligation to fund them. Id.
44 Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 566 U.S. 189, 200 (2012).
45 See DaCosta v. Laird, 448 F.2d 1368, 1370 (2d Cir. 1971).
46 See Zivotofsky v. Sec’y of State, 725 F.3d 197, 204–05, 219–20 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (on
remand, finding Section 214(d) unconstitutional as infringing the president’s recognition
power), aff’d, Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076, 2096 (2015).
47 See DaCosta v. Laird, 471 F.2d 1146, 1147–48 (2d Cir. 1973).
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how to wind down the war seems within the category of
presidential discretion Chief Justice Marshall identified in
Marbury v. Madison, in the earliest formulation of the political
question doctrine.48 And it calls for a political solution: if
Congress wanted to narrow presidential discretion, it could write
a narrower statute.
The modern example of the conflict against the Islamic State
is also illustrative. Arguably, Congress authorized U.S. military
action against the Islamic State, either through the 2001
Authorization for the Use of Military Force against the
perpetrators of the 9/11 attacks, or the 2003 Authorization for
the Use of Military Force in Iraq. But reaching either conclusion
requires inquiry into difficult facts: to what extent the Islamic
State was connected to al Qaeda, or to what extent the Islamic
State was connected to prior Iraqi insurgent groups against
whom military action was clearly authorized.49 Adjudication of
these questions seems problematic and beyond Zivotofsky’s
direction. The inquiry would involve not merely the ordinary
tools of constitutional interpretation, but also resolution
of factual disputes and characterizations that may be less
judicially manageable.
Of course, often there will be no arguable congressional
authorization of a military conflict—as with the U.S. action in
Libya in 2011.50 And sometimes no plausible argument will
stretch an authorization to cover a remote conflict. Judge Oakes’
opinion in the Cambodian bombing case51 may be an example of
this: as the bombing was secret (and indeed the war had been
fought on the premise that Cambodia was neutral), Congress’s
appropriations for winding down the war it knew about seem
inadequate to approve the Cambodian bombing, without
requiring any inquiry into disputed facts or characterizations.52
Nonetheless, it seems likely that some disputes over the
scope of congressional authorization will depend on how one
characterizes the nature and purpose of the hostilities.
Adjudication thus runs substantial risk of infringing the
48 See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 165–67 (1803); see also infra Part
IV (discussing Marbury).
49 See generally Prakash, supra note 40 (considering these issues); see also infra Part
VI (discussing litigation related to military action against the Islamic State).
50 See Prakash, supra note 40, at 999.
51 Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 484 F.2d 1307, 1315–18 (2d Cir. 1973) (Judge
Oakes, dissenting).
52 See John Hart Ely, The American War in Indochina, Part II: The
Unconstitutionality of the War They Didn't Tell Us About, 42 STAN. L. REV. 1093, 1137–38,
1147–48 (1990).
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president’s war-fighting discretion or of involving the judiciary in
the finding or characterization of facts for which it is manifestly
unsuited. Both of these lines of the political question doctrine
remain viable after Zivotofsky and should foreclose some aspects
of war powers adjudication.
E.

Implications
In sum, real and hypothetical war powers litigation indicate
that the issues sometimes are largely questions of constitutional
or statutory meaning and sometimes turn on disputed facts
or subjective characterizations. A Zivotofsky-inspired approach
suggests that the former are not political questions while the
latter may be. Interpretation of statutes and the Constitution as
a general matter is, Zivotofsky said, entrusted to the courts,53 and
courts do not lack standards to decide such cases even where
finding the right answer may be difficult or pose potential
embarrassment to the president. The second category of cases,
however, raises difficulties on both prongs of the political
question doctrine that Zivotofsky left intact. Where there are
conflicting views as to how to fight a war or how to characterize
an enemy or a U.S. objective, the Constitution commits the
discretion to the president, and the president should not be
second-guessed by the courts (per Marbury).54 Situations where
the facts are disputed, rapidly evolving, and difficult to
characterize, suggest a lack of judicially manageable standards
(or, to put it another way, a practical need to defer to the
president’s assessment of the hostile situation).
IV. ZIVOTOFSKY AND THE HISTORICAL ROLE OF THE COURTS
This section considers whether an expanded role for courts in
war powers adjudication is consistent with the Constitution’s
original meaning and the Constitution’s implementation in
the early post-ratification era. It finds that Zivotofsky’s
distinction between interpreting legal texts, on one hand, and
second-guessing the exercise of executive discretion, on the other,
has strong roots in post-ratification practice and is supported by
the Constitution’s text.
To begin with the text, the Constitution does not suggest any
difference in the courts’ role in war powers adjudication (and
other foreign affairs-related adjudication) as compared to

See Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 566 U.S. 189, 200–02 (2012).
See generally Jide Nzelibe, The Uniqueness of Foreign Affairs, 89 IOWA L. REV.
941 (2004).
53
54
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ordinary constitutional litigation.55 The judiciary’s powers and
duties with respect to adjudication are conveyed in general
terms, without reservation as to war or foreign affairs powers.56
The grants of war and military powers to other branches of
government are intermingled within the Constitution’s text with
other grants of—and limits on—governmental powers without
singling them out for special nonjusticiability. In contrast, some
particular subjects may seem to be textually reserved to other
branches. For example, “[e]ach House shall be the Judge of the
Elections, Returns and Qualifications of its own Members;”57
“[e]ach House may determine the Rules of its Proceedings,
punish its Members for disorderly Behavior, and, with the
Concurrence of two thirds, expel a Member”;58 and “[t]he Senate
shall have the sole Power to try all Impeachments.”59 But there is
no similar language relating to war powers controversies.
Further, leading contemporaneous assessments of the text do not
indicate any war-related exception to the courts’ decisional
authority. Most notably, Hamilton’s Federalist No. 78, setting out
the theory of judicial review later substantially adopted by
Marbury v. Madison, does not refer to non-justiciability of war
powers controversies.60
Modern assessments of the political question doctrine
typically associate its origins with Chief Justice Marshall’s
opinion in Marbury.61 An examination of Marbury and its
subsequent applications indicate that Zivotofsky is consistent
with early practice. Marbury’s discussion of the issue was
as follows:
By the constitution of the United States, the President is invested
with certain important political powers, in the exercise of which he is
to use his own discretion, and is accountable only to his country in his
political character, and to his own conscience. To aid him in the
performance of these duties, he is authorized to appoint certain
officers, who act by his authority and in conformity with his orders.
In such cases, their acts are his acts; and whatever opinion may be
entertained of the manner in which executive discretion may be used,

55 See M ICHAEL D. R AMSEY , T HE C ONSTITUTION ’ S T EXT IN F OREIGN A FFAIRS
321–41 (2007).
56 See U.S. CONST. art. III.
57 Id. art. I, § 5, cl. 1.
58 Id. art. I, § 5, cl. 2.
59 Id. art. I, § 3, cl. 6.
60 See RAMSEY, supra note 55, at 330–31.
61 See, e.g., Rachel E. Barkow, More Supreme than Court? The Fall of the Political
Question Doctrine and the Rise of Judicial Supremacy, 102 C OLUM . L. R EV . 237,
239 (2002).
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still there exists, and can exist, no power to control that discretion.
The subjects are political. They respect the nation, not individual
rights, and being entrusted to the executive, the decision of the
executive is conclusive. The application of this remark will be
perceived by adverting to the act of congress for establishing the
department of foreign affairs. This officer, as his duties were
prescribed by that act, is to conform precisely to the will of the
President. He is the mere organ by whom that will is communicated.
The acts of such an officer, as an officer, can never be examinable by
the courts.
But when the legislature proceeds to impose on that officer other
duties; when he is directed peremptorily to perform certain acts; when
the rights of individuals are dependent on the performance of those
acts; he is so far the officer of the law; is amenable to the laws for his
conduct; and cannot at his discretion sport away the vested rights
of others.
The conclusion from this reasoning is, that where the heads of
departments are the political or confidential agents of the executive,
merely to execute the will of the President, or rather to act in cases in
which the executive possesses a constitutional or legal discretion,
nothing can be more perfectly clear than that their acts are only
politically examinable. But where a specific duty is assigned by law,
and individual rights depend upon the performance of that duty, it
seems equally clear that the individual who considers himself injured,
has a right to resort to the laws of his country for a remedy.62

Marshall then gave as an example: “The power of nominating to
the senate, and the power of appointing the person nominated,
are political powers, to be exercised by the President according to
his own discretion.”63 In contrast, he said, once the appointment
is made, the president lacks discretion to revoke it (in the case of
an officer not removable at will by the president).64
One might conclude from this discussion that Marshall’s idea
of political questions was tautological: that is, where the
president had discretion unbounded by law, courts—whose power
is to “say what the law is”65—had no role. (This would be the
case, for example, in the nomination/appointment illustration
Marshall invoked.) But Marshall might also have had in mind
situations in which the president exercised discretion bounded by
law; for example, where the president made factual assessments
or military judgments in support of the president’s constitutional
powers. In any event, Marbury’s concept of political questions

62
63
64
65

Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 165–66 (1803).
Id. at 167.
Id. at 162.
Id. at 177.
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arising from executive discretion would not displace the judicial
role in interpreting legal texts, even where those texts relate to
the extent of executive discretion. As Zivotofsky explained, there
is a difference between asking whom the Constitution empowers
to make a decision and asking whether the correct decision
was made.
This distinction runs implicitly through post-Marbury cases
in the war and foreign affairs areas. Little v. Barreme, decided
the next year, challenged the legality of the president’s order to
seize ships sailing to or from French possessions during the naval
hostilities with France.66 A statute authorized seizure of ships
sailing “to”—but not “from”—French possessions; the Court read
the statute literally and exclusively, finding the challenged
seizure to be unlawful.67 The Court did not consider whether the
case presented a political question. Similarly, in Murray
v. Schooner Charming Betsy, the Court considered whether
the U.S. Navy’s seizure of a ship was authorized by the
Non-Intercourse Act; the Court found it was not authorized
because the ship was not American-owned (in doing so, giving
rise to the “Charming Betsy canon” that statutes should, if
possible, be construed not to violate international law).68 As in
Little, the Court did not consider whether the issue was a
political question. Finally, in Brown v. United States, the Court
again found a seizure unconstitutional—in that case, the
executive branch’s seizure of British-owned timber during the
War of 1812.69 Writing for the Court, Marshall found the seizure
unconstitutional because it was not authorized by Congress’s
declaration of war and therefore it was beyond the president’s
constitutional powers.70 Thus, all three cases found executive
branch action in wartime to be illegal without expressing any
reservations about justiciability. That view is consistent with
Marbury because in each case, the question was not whether the
president or the executive branch had properly exercised
discretion, but whether the president or the executive branch had
Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170, 178 (1804).
Id. at 178–79.
Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 117–18 (1804).
69 Brown v. United States, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 110, 150–52 (1814).
70 See id. at 122–25; see also David L. Sloss, Michael D. Ramsey & William S. Dodge,
International Law in the Supreme Court to 1860, in INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE U.S.
SUPREME COURT: CONTINUITY AND CHANGE 7, 40–41 (David L. Sloss, Michael D. Ramsey
& William S. Dodge eds., 2011). Specifically, Brown was an application of the Charming
Betsy canon: the Court found that international law generally allowed enemy aliens a
period after a declaration of war to withdraw their property to avoid confiscation, and
that the 1812 declaration of war, because it lacked language to the contrary, should be
read not to violate this practice. Id.
66
67
68
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been granted discretionary power by the Constitution or
applicable statutes.
In contrast, the Court did appear to invoke a form of the
political question doctrine in its early cases to avoid reviewing
executive branch factual determinations or other discretionary
determinations, or to avoid making such determinations for
itself. In United States v. Palmer, for example, the Court refused
to assess the legitimacy of a rebellious government in the
Spanish colonies.71 Marshall wrote for the Court:
Those questions which respect the rights of a part of a foreign empire,
which asserts, and is contending for its independence, and the conduct
which must be observed by the courts of the union towards the
subjects of such section of an empire who may be brought before the
tribunals of this country, are equally delicate and difficult.
As it is understood that the construction which has been given to the
act of congress, will render a particular answer to them unnecessary,
the court will only observe, that such questions are generally rather
political than legal in their character. They belong more properly to
those who can declare what the law shall be; who can place the nation
in such a position with respect to foreign powers as to their own
judgment shall appear wise; to whom are entrusted all its foreign
relations; than to that tribunal whose power as well as duty is
confined to the application of the rule which the legislature may
prescribe for it. In such contests a nation may engage itself with the
one party or the other—may observe absolute neutrality—may
recognize the new state absolutely—or may make a limited
recognition of it. The proceeding in courts must depend so entirely on
the course of the government, that it is difficult to give a precise
answer to questions which do not refer to a particular nation. It may
be said, generally, that if the government remains neutral, and
recognizes the existence of a civil war, its courts cannot consider as
criminal those acts of hostility which war authorizes, and which the
new government may direct against its enemy. To decide otherwise,
would be to determine that the war prosecuted by one of the parties
was unlawful, and would be to arrange the nation to which the court
belongs against that party. This would transcend the limits prescribed
to the judicial department.72

Similarly, in Rose v. Himely, Marshall wrote for the
Court: “It is for governments to decide whether they will consider
St. Domingo as an independent nation, and until such decision
shall be made, or France shall relinquish her claim, courts of
justice must consider the ancient state of things as remaining

71
72

United States v. Palmer, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 610, 634–35 (1818).
Id.
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unaltered . . . .”73 Notably, none of these cases involved a question
of executive or congressional authority under the Constitution or
a statute, and thus they did not involve pure questions of
interpretation of legal texts as emphasized in Zivotofsky.74
The historical litigation most similar to potential modern
war powers litigation is The Prize Cases, decided in 1863. The
issue was whether President Lincoln’s naval blockade of the
South during the Civil War was unconstitutional as beyond
presidential power.75 Despite the wartime setting, the Court
decided the case on the merits. As a co-author and I previously
described it:
The most immediately striking aspect of the Prize Cases is that the
Court considered a constitutional challenge to the President’s military
actions during wartime and very nearly ruled against the President.
And this attention came despite strong arguments by the President’s
counsel for judicial abstention (including, apparently, the suggestion
that deciding the merits would make the Court “an ally of
the enemy”). . . .
But although the Court made a show of deciding the cases on their
merits, the majority opinion contained language of substantial
deference to the executive. The Court was quite willing to accept the
President’s characterization of the situation as war (even though, at
the time the blockade was proclaimed, shots had been fired only at a
single fort, and no one had been killed by hostile fire). Indeed,
[Justice] Grier [in the majority opinion] asserted that the President’s
determination on this ground was conclusive on the Court . . . .

73 Rose v. Himely, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 241, 272 (1808). For later cases, see Foster v.
Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 307 (1829) (“In a controversy between two nations
concerning national boundary . . . the Court [must] conform its decisions to the will of the
legislature . . . .”); Williams v. Suffolk Ins. Co., 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 415, 419–20 (1839)
(finding that the executive determination that Falkland Islands were not part of the
territory of Buenos Aires was conclusive on the judiciary); Kennett v. Chambers, 55 U.S.
(14 How.) 38, 51 (1852) (finding that executive determination regarding status of Texas
after the Texas revolution was conclusive on judiciary); Doe v. Braden, 57 U.S. (16 How.)
635, 635 (1854) (holding that whether the King of Spain had authority to annul land
grants made to Spanish citizens was not a judicial question); and Jones v. United States,
137 U.S. 202, 212 (1890) (“Who is the sovereign, de jure or de facto, of a territory is not a
judicial, but a political question, the determination of which by the legislative and
executive departments . . . conclusively binds the judges . . . .”). See also Tara Leigh
Grove, The Lost History of the Political Question Doctrine, 90 N.Y.U. L. R EV. 1908,
1909–15 (2015) (reviewing cases); Caleb Nelson, Adjudication in the Political Branches,
107 COLUM. L. REV. 559, 592 (2007) (“[A]n important branch of [the political question]
doctrine [in the nineteenth century] operated to identify factual questions on which courts
would accept the political branches’ determinations as binding.”).
74 See Grove, supra note 73, at 1918 n.41 (concluding that “the traditional [political
question] doctrine did not encompass constitutional questions (that is, the determination
whether a statute or other governmental action complied with the Constitution)”).
75 The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635, 640–41 (1863).
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On the other hand, notwithstanding the language of deference, on the
crucial question whether the insurrection had progressed to the level
of a full-blown civil war the Court also referred to contemporaneous
recognition of a state of war by foreign nations, the comparatively
amorphous and evolving nature of civil war, the disruption of the
courts, and the commonsense obviousness of its conclusion before
making the point about deference. Indeed, one could easily argue that
the executive deference point . . . was a throwaway claim of little
consequence placed late in the opinion.76

Thus, while the decision can be read to support varying
levels of deference to executive factual determinations, it strongly
supports the basic justiciability of war powers claims. To be sure,
the decision came long after the immediate post-ratification
period, and so may not be strongly indicative of the original view
of the courts’ role in such controversies. But it indicates that, at
least in the nineteenth century, constitutional war powers
questions were not regarded as categorically beyond the reach
of courts.
V. POLICY
The foregoing discussion suggests that Zivotofsky can be
applied to war powers litigation to produce a manageable but not
excessive role for courts. This section briefly considers whether it
should be as a matter of contemporary policy.
To begin, I assume courts—if they reach the merits—might
plausibly find significant instances where congressional approval
of hostilities is constitutionally required. The most obvious
concern is that this conclusion would interfere with national
security by preventing necessary U.S. military action. This
concern might arise from at least three circumstances: (1) courts
might require the president to desist from needed action; (2) the
president might not take action after concluding that Congress
would not approve or when Congress in fact refuses to approve;
and (3) the president might not take action because it appears
Congress would not be able to approve in time to make the
action meaningful.
As to the first category, the president’s most evident recourse
in the event of an adverse judicial decision is not to stop
hostilities, but to gain Congress’s approval. If the military action
is truly necessary, Congress can be expected to approve. If

76 Thomas H. Lee & Michael D. Ramsey, The Story of the Prize Cases: Executive
Action and Judicial Review in Wartime, in PRESIDENTIAL POWER STORIES 86–87
(Christopher H. Schroeder & Curtis A. Bradley eds., 2009).
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Congress does not approve, that at least raises the possibility
that the action is not necessary (so the president’s inability to
pursue it would not be a material downside to adjudication).
Whether Congress is, in the general case, likely to mis-assess the
need for military action seems speculative. The second category
involves similar analysis. The president’s inability to act due to
Congress’s actual or anticipated failure to approve is problematic
only if one thinks Congress is systematically likely to disapprove
military actions the president favors and are needed.77 It is not
clear that is the case. As to the third category, Congress has
shown—for example, in approving the post-9/11 Authorization for
the Use of Military Force (“AUMF”)78—that it can act relatively
quickly. In any event, in the face of a time-sensitive emergency,
the president has the option of acting quickly and seeking
retroactive approval—a course followed by presidents in
various circumstances.79
A related concern is that if courts find an ongoing war
unconstitutional, it may be difficult and dangerous for the United
States to disengage. Of course, Congress can solve the problem by
authorizing the war, but suppose Congress does not approve of
the war. Arguments for finding a political question in the
Vietnam-era cases in part reflect this concern: even if Congress
did not approve the war, the war could not be easily discontinued
at judicial direction.
This concern, while substantial, may be overstated. First,
many conflicts may be relatively easy to discontinue.80 Second,
even without a broad political question doctrine, courts will have
various methods of restraint. For example, the D.C. Circuit in the
Vietnam-era litigation found the war’s initiation to have been
unconstitutional due to lack of congressional authorization, but
refused to order any remedy.81 Third, and perhaps most
importantly, if courts begin more active adjudication of war
77 For example, in 2013 President Obama considered military action against Syria in
response to the Syrian government’s use of chemical weapons against rebel forces.
However, the U.S. Congress appeared unlikely to approve, and the President decided not
to proceed without Congress’s approval. See Ramsey, supra note 40, at 714–15 (discussing
this episode). It is not clear whether this is an example of Congress impeding a needed
military action or constraining an unwise one.
78 The 2001 AUMF was approved on September 18, 2001, seven days after the 9/11
attack. See Authorization for the Use of Military Force, Pub. Law No. 107–40, 115 Stat.
224 (2001).
79 For example, by President Lincoln at the start of the Civil War. See Lee &
Ramsey, supra note 76, at 53.
80 One could easily imagine prompt U.S. disengagement from a conflict such as the
2011 Libya intervention.
81 Mitchell v. Laird, 488 F.2d 611, 616 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
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powers disputes, presidents would be less likely to undertake
substantial
commitments
without
Congress’s
approval.
Relatedly, courts can use situations in which they uphold
presidential action to establish a framework for when Congress’s
approval is required. For example, in The Prize Cases, decided
during the Civil War, the Court upheld the challenged
presidential action (imposing a blockade on the South); the
majority emphasized that the blockade was a defensive response
to hostilities begun by the other side, while noting that the
president could not begin offensive hostilities without Congress’s
approval.82 Similarly, the Second Circuit in the Vietnam-era
cases found that Congress’s approval was required, but that
approval had been given.83
A further potential problem with enhanced adjudication is
that courts, nervous about the downsides discussed above, might
give the president more authority than the Constitution allows,
and thus license greater presidential adventurism by giving it
formal judicial approval. This concern cannot be entirely
discounted, but seems speculative in light of the remedy of
subsequent congressional authorization (that is, in most cases,
courts would be able to ascribe any bad consequences to
Congress’s failure to authorize the military action).
On the other hand, some material advantages seem to arise
from more aggressive war powers adjudication. First, as
discussed above,84 a Zivotofsky-inspired approach seems most
consistent with the judiciary’s original constitutional role.
Marbury—echoing Hamilton’s Federalist No. 78—called for the
judiciary to say what the law is, without exception for
cases affecting foreign affairs or cases that might involve
embarrassment or multifarious pronouncements. 85 The
expansive Baker factors were a modern invention. In the early
post-ratification period 86 (and throughout the nineteenth
century87) courts adjudicated the legality of military force
without invoking political question concerns. It is true, of course,
that Marbury acknowledged a category of political questions
82 The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635, 668–69 (1863); Lee & Ramsey, supra note
76, at 72–78, 85.
83 See, e.g., DaCosta v. Laird, 448 F.2d 1368, 1369–70 (2d Cir. 1971).
84 See supra Part IV.
85 See RAMSEY, supra note 55, at 321, 329–34.
86 See, e.g., Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170, 176–79 (1804); RAMSEY, supra
note 55, at 332–33 (listing further examples).
87 See The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. at 668–69; see also Mitchell v. Harmony, 54 U.S. (13
How.) 115, 115 (1851) (allowing a claim against military officer for seizure of property in
Mexico in connection with war effort despite claims of military necessity).
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outside judicial competence.88 But that category does not extend
to matters of constitutional and statutory interpretation.
Second, enhanced judicial involvement would likely provide
a greater check on the president. Currently it is largely left to
Congress to provide a political check. However, Congress’s
practical ability to check the president in war powers matters
seems open to doubt. Congress may lack the incentives and
political will to contest the president in war powers controversies
except in extreme circumstances. Although one may debate
whether more checks upon the president in war powers are
desirable, they seem consistent with the Constitution’s original
design. Multiple framers argued that the president’s excessive
tendency to war required congressional involvement in the
war-initiation decision.89
Third, modern war powers authority suffers from the
perception that it lacks a rule of law. That is, with regard to any
presidential military action, there is debate in commentary (and
sometimes in Congress) whether it is constitutional, often with
multiple voices claiming the president is acting illegally.90
However, without an authoritative decision maker to resolve
these claims, the law remains unsettled and contested. Even if
(as was likely true in the Vietnam conflict) the president acts
with adequate approval, constitutional questions may cloud his
authority. The president (and the country) likely would have
benefitted from a clear, prompt judicial ruling that the Vietnam
conflict was constitutional.
Finally, the likely result of greater judicial involvement
would be greater cooperation between the president and
Congress in war powers matters. In many modern conflicts in
which congressional approval was not sought, approval likely
would have been forthcoming: the president might choose not to
seek approval because there might seem no immediate gain from
doing so, not because there is a major disagreement between the
president and Congress. It seems plausible, for example, that
Congress would have approved military strikes in Libya, and it

88 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 165–66 (1803); see also United States
v. Palmer, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 610, 634–35 (1818) (referring to “questions [that] are
generally rather political than legal in their character”); Durand v. Hollins, 8 F. Cas. 111,
112 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1860) (finding that the president had constitutional power to protect
U.S. citizens abroad, and that whether the use of force was necessary in the particular
circumstances was a matter of executive discretion and thus was a “public political
question” unreviewable under Marbury).
89 See RAMSEY, supra note 55, at 235–37.
90 See, e.g., Prakash, supra note 40.
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seems likely Congress would approve continuing military action
against the Islamic State. In the long term, the president would
be in a stronger position directing a unified rather than a
unilateral military action.
VI. POST-ZIVOTOFSKY WAR POWERS LITIGATION IN THE LOWER
COURTS
This section reviews post-Zivotofsky war powers litigation in
the lower courts, focusing on two leading cases: Jaber v. United
States91 and Smith v. Obama.92 Although both decisions found a
political question barrier to the particular dispute, their
application of Zivotofsky follows the discussion above and
confirms the justiciability of some war powers disputes.
In Jaber, the plaintiffs’ relatives were killed by a U.S. drone
strike in Yemen.93 The relatives were not targets of the strike but
unfortunately were in the vicinity of al Qaeda members who were
targeted. The plaintiffs made various claims under two U.S.
statutes, the Alien Tort Statute (“ATS”) and the Torture Victim
Protection Act (“TVPA”), that the strike violated international
law.94 The D.C. Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of
the claim on political question grounds, with this assessment
of Zivotofsky:
Zivotofsky confirms no per se rule renders a claim nonjusticiable solely
because it implicates foreign relations. Rather, it recognizes that, in
foreign policy cases, courts must first ascertain if “[t]he federal courts
are . . . being asked to supplant a foreign policy decision of the
political branches with the courts’ own unmoored determination” or,
instead, merely tasked with, for instance, the “familiar judicial
exercise” of determining how a statute should be interpreted or
whether it is constitutional. In the latter case, the claim is justiciable.
Therefore, if the court is called upon to serve as “a forum for
reconsidering the wisdom of discretionary decisions made by the
political branches in the realm of foreign policy or national security[,]”
then the political question doctrine is implicated, and the court
cannot proceed.
Zivotofsky sought only to enforce a statute alleged to directly regulate
the Executive, and the reviewing court needed to determine only “if
Zivotofsky’s interpretation of the statute [was] correct, and whether
the statute [was] constitutional.” The Court was not called upon

861 F.3d 241 (D.C. Cir. 2017).
217 F. Supp. 3d 283 (D.D.C. 2016).
Jaber, 861 F.3d at 243.
94 Id. The plaintiffs did not claim that the strike was unconstitutional, presumably
because they thought the 2001 AUMF had authorized hostilities against al Qaeda
personnel in Yemen.
91
92
93
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to impose its own foreign policy judgment on the political branches,
only to say whether the congressional statute encroached on the
Executive’s constitutional authority. This is the wheelhouse of the
Judiciary, and accordingly, it does not constitute a nonjusticiable
political question. Here, however, Plaintiffs assert claims under the
TVPA and the ATS that would require the Court to second-guess the
wisdom of the Executive’s decision to employ lethal force against a
national security target—to determine, among other things, whether
“an urgent military purpose or other emergency justified” a particular
drone strike. Indeed, Plaintiffs’ request is more analogous to an action
challenging the Secretary of State’s independent refusal to recognize
Israel as the rightful sovereign of the city of Jerusalem, a decision
clearly committed to executive discretion.95

This assessment seems correct and consistent with some
justiciability of war powers claims. The key is the court’s
characterization of the claims as “requir[ing] the Court to
second-guess the wisdom of the Executive’s decision to employ
lethal force against a national security target—to determine,
among other things, whether an ‘urgent military purpose or
other emergency justified’ a particular drone strike.”96 This
situation-specific analysis, which does seem to render
justiciability problematic even under a broad view of Zivotofsky,
would not be present in the more typical constitutional dispute
over presidential war initiation. Where the question is simply
whether the president has independent constitutional authority
to act in response to a set of undisputed events, the situation is
analogous to the one described by the court as justiciable: where
the court is “tasked with, for instance, the ‘familiar judicial
exercise’ of determining how a statute should be interpreted or
whether it is constitutional.”97 In the war powers situation,
typically the court would be assessing whether an executive
action (rather than a statute) is unconstitutional, but that should
not be a material distinction in many cases. As in Zivotofsky (and
in contrast to Jaber), the question for the court would be which
branch has decision-making authority under the Constitution,
not what decision should be made.
Smith v. Obama involved a service member’s constitutional
challenge to the president’s use of force against the Islamic State
in Iraq and Syria.98 The central claim was that neither the 2001
AUMF nor the 2002 authorization of the action against Saddam
Hussein in Iraq provided congressional authorization for military
95
96
97
98

Id. at 248–49 (citations omitted).
Id. at 249 (citation omitted).
Id. at 248 (quoting Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 566 U.S. 189, 196 (2012)).
See Smith v. Obama, 217 F. Supp. 3d 283, 284 (D.D.C. 2016).

Do Not Delete

200

3/3/18 7:16 PM

Chapman Law Review

[Vol. 21:1

action against the Islamic State.99 The district court dismissed
the claim on political question grounds after a careful assessment
of Zivotofsky.100 Acknowledging that not all questions relating to
war are nonjusticiable, the court stated:
[T]he Court begins by clarifying the precise questions posed by
Plaintiff’s claims. Plaintiff’s claims are premised on the notion that
Congress has not previously authorized the use of force against [the
Islamic State]. Defendant disputes this. Resolving this dispute would
require the Court to determine whether the legal authorizations for
the use of military force relied on by President Obama—the 2001 and
2002 AUMFs—in fact authorize the use of force against [the Islamic
State]. With regard to the 2001 AUMF, the Court would have to
determine whether the President is correct that [the Islamic State] is
among “those nations, organizations, or persons” that “planned,
authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on
September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or persons,” and
that Operation Inherent Resolve represents “necessary and
appropriate force” against that group. With regard to the 2002 AUMF,
the Court would have to determine whether the President is correct
that operations against [the Islamic State] are “necessary and
appropriate in order to . . . defend the national security of the United
States against the continuing threat posed by Iraq.” For the reasons
set out below, the Court finds that these are political questions under
the first two Baker factors: the issues raised are primarily ones
committed to the political branches of government, and the Court
lacks judicially manageable standards, and is otherwise ill-equipped,
to resolve them.101

The court then elaborated:
Plaintiff’s attempts to analogize his case to Zivotofsky are strained.
Although, as in Zivotofsky, statutes are involved in this case—in
particular, the War Powers Resolution, the 2001 AUMF and the 2002
AUMF—this case does not present nearly the same fundamental legal
issues as were at issue in Zivotofsky. The questions posed in this case
go significantly beyond interpreting statutes and determining whether

99 See Charlie Savage, An Army Captain Takes Obama to Court Over ISIS Fight,
N.Y. TIMES (May 4, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/05/us/islamic-state-warpowers-lawsuit-obama.html?mcubz=0; Bruce Ackerman, Is America’s War on ISIS
Illegal?, N.Y. TIMES (May 4, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/05/opinion/isamericas-war-on-isis-illegal.html?mcubz=0. The statutes, rather than independent
presidential power, were the president’s principal bases for authority to take military
action against the Islamic State. See Ramsey, supra note 40, at 710–11.
100 See Smith, 217 F. Supp. 3d at 297. The court also found that Smith lacked
standing as an independent ground for dismissal. Id. at 285. The case is currently on
appeal to the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, where the standing issue has taken a
central role after the plaintiff’s departure from active service in the military. See Brief for
Appellee at 17–25, Smith v. Obama (No. 16-5377), https://www.scribd.com/document/
351181196/DOJ-Response-to-Nathan-Michael-Smith-Appeal [http://perma.cc/3G5S-LSDK].
101 Smith, 217 F. Supp. 3d at 298 (citations omitted).
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they are constitutional. Plaintiff asks the Court to second-guess the
Executive’s application of these statutes to specific facts on the ground
in an ongoing combat mission halfway around the world. For example,
the Court is not asked simply to “interpret” the 2001 AUMF, or to
determine its constitutionality. It is asked to determine whether the
President is correct that [the Islamic State], as it exists today, is an
appropriate target under that resolution based on the nature and
extent of [the Islamic State]’s relationship and connections with the
terrorist organization that the President has determined was
responsible for the September 11, 2001 attacks. The Court would also
have to go further than simply “interpreting” the 2002 AUMF. It
would have to determine whether the President is correct that the
ongoing military action against [the Islamic State] is in fact
“necessary and appropriate in order to . . . defend the national
security of the United States against the continuing threat posed
by Iraq.”
The reality, then, is more nuanced than Plaintiff suggests. Plaintiff’s
claims raise mixed questions of both discretionary military
judgment and statutory interpretation. The Court does not read
Zivotofsky as foreclosing the application of the political question
doctrine under this scenario.102

Again, the court’s emphasis is on the claim involving “mixed
questions of both discretionary military judgment and statutory
interpretation.”103 As discussed above, one can imagine many
situations in which war-initiation disputes are such mixed
questions; but one can also imagine many situations in which
such disputes are not mixed questions and involve only questions
of constitutional interpretation. Consistent with Zivotofsky, the
Smith court’s analysis suggests that the latter disputes might
be justiciable.
The court then focused on the key Zivotofsky factors: textual
commitment and judicially manageable standards:
First, certain aspects of the questions posed by this case are
indisputably and completely committed to the political branches of
government. Both the 2001 and 2002 AUMFs authorize only that force
that the President determines is “necessary and appropriate.” The
necessity and appropriateness of military action is precisely the type
of discretionary military determination that is committed to the
political branches and which the Court has no judicially manageable
standards to adjudicate.
Second, . . . [b]ased on the pleadings thus far alone, the Court can
easily discern that this case raises factual questions that are not of a
type the Court is equipped to handle with traditional judicially

102
103

Id. at 299–300 (citations omitted).
Id. at 300.
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manageable standards. The President and Department of Defense
officials apparently believe that [the Islamic State] is connected with
al Qaeda and that, despite public rifts, some allegiances between the
groups persist and [the Islamic State] continues to pursue the same
mission today as it did before allegedly splintering from al Qaeda.
Plaintiff disputes these factual assertions, relying on an affidavit from
scholars of Islamic Law that argue that as of today, the groups are in
fact sufficiently distinct, and potentially even antagonistic, that they
can no longer be viewed as the same terrorist organization. Resolving
this dispute would require inquiries into sensitive military
determinations, presumably made based on intelligence collected on
the ground in a live theatre of combat, and potentially changing and
developing on an ongoing basis. See Al–Aulaqi v. Obama, 727
F.Supp.2d 1, 45 (D.D.C. 2010) (“The difficulty that U.S. courts would
encounter if they were tasked with ‘ascertaining the ‘facts’ of military
decisions exercised thousands of miles from the forum, lies at the
heart of the determination whether the question [posed] is a
‘political’ one.’”) (quoting DaCosta v. Laird, 471 F.2d 1146, 1148
(2d Cir. 1973)).104

Thus, if a war powers claim did not involve such factual
determinations (and some plausibly might not), this reasoning
suggests that the claim would be justiciable.105 As a result, the

Id. at 300–01 (some citations omitted).
The court added a further consideration that might pose a broader barrier to
war powers litigation, but that also seems unsupported by either Zivotofsky or
the Constitution:
Finally, an additional factor makes judicial intervention particularly
inappropriate on the specific facts of this case. Unlike the situation presented
in Zivotofsky, the Court in this case is not presented with a dispute between
the two political branches regarding the challenged action. In fact, Congress
has repeatedly provided funding for the effort against [the Islamic State]. For
example, on November 10, 2014, President Obama sent a letter to the Speaker
of the House of Representatives requesting that Congress consider proposed
amendments to the 2015 Budget to provide funding for Operation Inherent
Resolve. The letter explained that “[t]hese amendments would provide $5.6
billion for OCO activities to degrade and ultimately defeat the Islamic State of
Iraq and the Levant (ISIL)—including military operations as part of Operation
Inherent Resolve.” President Obama also attached a letter from the Director of
the Office of Management and Budget, which explained in some detail the
military operations that the additional budget would be used to fund. In
December 2014, Congress passed the Consolidated and Further Continuing
Appropriations Acts of 2015, in which it appropriated the funds the President
had sought. . . .
The Congressional budget activity cited above by Defendant, and relied on by
the Court, demonstrates that the Court can discern no impasse or conflict
between the political branches on the question of whether [the Islamic State] is
an appropriate target under the AUMFs cited by the President as authority for
Operation Inherent Resolve.
This lack of conflict is relevant to the justiciability of Plaintiff's claims under
the political question doctrine because judicial intervention into military
affairs is particularly inappropriate when the two political branches to whom
104
105
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leading post-Zivotofsky war powers cases indicate that not all
war powers questions are political questions even though some of
them are.
CONCLUSION
In sum, a post-Zivotofsky analysis in separation of powers
cases implies a distinction between, on the one hand, cases that
involve legal interpretation, resting on traditional textual and
historical materials, and on the other hand, cases that involve
disputed facts, policies or characterizations. Applied to war
powers litigation, this distinction seems both manageable and
useful; it suggests that some war powers disputes are justiciable
while others are not. More generally, the viability of Zivotofskyinspired analysis in the especially difficult area of war powers
suggests its broad potential for lasting influence in separation of
powers and foreign affairs disputes.

war-making powers are committed are not in dispute as to the military action
at issue.
Id. at 301–02 (footnotes and citations omitted). For this conclusion, the court cited only
pre-Zivotofsky cases and Justice Sotomayor’s concurrence in Zivotofsky. Id. at 302–03.
Although it is true that Zivotofsky involved a conflict between Congress and the president,
the majority opinion did not suggest that such a conflict was essential to its finding of
justiciability (and no other Justice joined Justice Sotomayor’s suggestion that it should
be). Further, as the Court has emphasized elsewhere, the structural provisions of the
Constitution exist not merely to protect the powers of particular branches of government,
but principally to protect individual liberty by assuring checked and divided powers
among all the branches. See Bond v. United States, 564 U.S. 211, 223 (2011).
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